Family, Marriage and Gender Roles: How Families and Marriage Relate to Gender Roles

J Marriage Fam. Writer manuscript; available in PMC 2019 Feb i.

Published in final edited form as:

PMCID: PMC5766036

NIHMSID: NIHMS903762

Changing Gender Norms and Marriage Dynamics in the United States

Léa Pessin

Population Inquiry Institute, Pennsylvania State University, Address: 704 Oswald Tower, University Park, PA 16802, Telephone: 814-865-1849, Fax: 814-863-8342

Abstruse

Using a regional measure of gender norms from the General Social Surveys together with marital histories from the Panel Written report of Income Dynamics, this report explored how gender norms were associated with women'due south marriage dynamics betwixt 1968 and 2012. Results suggested that a college prevalence of egalitarian gender norms predicted a decline in spousal relationship formation. This decline was, notwithstanding, only true for women without a higher caste. For college-educated women, the clan between gender norms and marriage formation became positive when gender egalitarianism prevailed. The findings also revealed an inverted U-shaped human relationship between gender norms and divorce: an initial increase in divorce was observed when gender norms were predominantly traditional. The association, even so, reversed as gender norms became egalitarian. No differences by instruction were found for divorce. The findings partially support the gender revolution framework merely also highlight greater barriers to matrimony for depression-educated women every bit societies embrace gender equality.

Keywords: Divorce, education, family roles, matrimony, U.South. families

Introduction

In the second half of the twentieth century, the redefined gender roles of women at habitation and in the labor market translated into a withdrawal from wedlock, a decline in fertility, and an increase in marital instability. Unexpectedly, in the United States, divorce rates not only stabilized in the 1980s but also appear to accept declined since then (Goldstein, 1999). Following a like pattern, divorce rates too reached a plateau in several European countries (Härkönen, 2014). Ny the late 2000s, fertility trends likewise stopped declining across the developed world, with few exceptions (Goldstein, Sobotka, & Jasilioniene, 2009).

A contempo and novel explanation to demographic change suggests that the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms is central to agreement changes in partnership and fertility behaviors (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; McDonald, 2000). This idea, which I refer to every bit the gender revolution framework, argues that starting from the baby-boom era, demographic modify has undergone two distinct phases (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, & Lappegård, 2015). In the first phase, the discrepancy betwixt women's advancement in the public sphere and persistent traditional behavior in the individual sphere produced an increase in family instability and a decline in fertility. The second stage emerged at the plough of the twenty-first century and is nevertheless ongoing. In this stage, nosotros should detect a return of stable partnerships and fertility rates around replacement level as institutions and families starting time adapting to women's new roles outside the household.

An implication of the gender revolution framework is that changes in society-level gender norms are associated with private-level marriage behavior. An initial increment in the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms is predicted to lead to lower marriage rates and higher divorce rates. As egalitarian gender norms become dominant, we should see a return of stable partnerships. Fifty-fifty though previous studies accept shown empirical evidence for the gender revolution framework's predictions on fertility outcomes (Arpino, Esping-Andersen, & Pessin, 2015; Myrskylä, Kohler, & Billari, 2011), no study has explicitly tested if the human relationship also holds for marriage and divorce.

Furthermore, within the gender revolution framework, the link betwixt changes in gender norms and partnership beliefs are considered without making explicit reference to changes in marriage selectivity. I build upon the gender revolution perspective to argue that -in the United States- the adoption of egalitarian gender norms affects matrimony and divorce rates unequally across educational groups. Although previous studies have provided ample back up for an educational gradient of partnership behavior in the United States, little evidence exists on how college-education moderates the human relationship between changes in contextual gender norms and individual-level propensities to marry and divorce in the United States (see Kalmijn, 2013, for an exception on the case of Europe).

This study is framed by 2 chief research questions. Outset, is there an association betwixt the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms and spousal relationship formation and divorce in the Us? By addressing this question, I provide a showtime empirical test of the gender revolution framework and assess whether it holds for the U.s. betwixt the tardily 1960s and the early 2010s. 2nd, is the relationship between contextual gender norms and wedlock dynamics fifty-fifty beyond educational groups? I develop and test the idea that the adoption of egalitarian gender norms affects marriage and divorce rates unequally beyond educational groups. In particular, I expect that the predictions of the gender revolution framework of a return to stable partnerships when societies have adopted egalitarian gender norms to exist limited to the college-educated simply. I debate that, in a context of high inequality with limited institutional back up for families, such as the United states, the lower educated lack the opportunities and resources to form and maintain egalitarian relationships. To address these research questions, I combine gender office attitudes data from the General Social Surveys with individual-level marriage histories from the Console Study of Income Dynamics to empathize how changes in region-level gender norms accept influenced individual-level matrimony dynamics between 1968 and 2012.

Why the focus on marriage and non all types of partnership? The gender revolution framework predicts a return of stable partnerships equally the revolution nears its completion (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015). In the United States, the prevalence of cohabitation has continued to increase since the 1970s (Kennedy & Bumpass, 2008). However, in the United states of america, cohabitation cannot be treated as a direct substitute for marriage. Unlike the patterns observed in European countries (Cherlin, 2004), cohabiting unions take become increasingly unstable and less likely to lead to marriage (Guzzo, 2014)

In add-on to being the first quantitative written report to investigate the relationship between contextual gender norms and individual-level marriage behavior, this report makes three contributions to the literature. Starting time, I provide a more comprehensive empirical and theoretical understanding of how resource and opportunities, i.e. higher education, moderate the predictions of the gender revolution in the United States. Second, unlike previous studies that have used cross-sectional information and/or cross-national data, I apply longitudinal information on marriage behavior together with historical attitudinal data to capture the dynamic human relationship between changes in contextual gender norms and the determination to marry and divorce. Finally, I analyze jointly both entry into marriage and exit from marriage. The advantage of considering both events is that information technology provides a better agreement of the function played by spousal relationship selectivity in the relationship between contextual gender norms and marriage dynamics.

Background

The Gender Revolution Framework

The gender revolution framework was adult as an alternative theory to the 2nd Demographic Transition (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986) to understand recent reversals in family behavior (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015). The main tenet of the gender revolution framework is that, as societies embrace gender egalitarianism, fertility and partnerships are expected to stabilize. High divorce rates and lowest-depression fertility levels stand for to transitional trends rather than outcomes of the gender revolution. This is an important distinction from the Second Demographic Transition, which predicts an irreversible development toward low fertility and wedlock rates and high couple instability (Goldscheider et al., 2015).

The gender revolution framework suggests that demographic change can be divided into ii phases (Goldscheider et al., 2015). In the showtime phase, as societies move abroad from the breadwinner-homemaker model, the discrepancy betwixt women'southward advocacy outside the habitation and persistent traditional beliefs in the private sphere produce an increase in family instability and a decline in fertility (McDonald, 2000). In the second phase of the gender revolution, societies embrace an egalitarian view toward the family where both spouses are expected to financially provide for the family unit but also every bit engage in domestic work. At this phase, every bit institutions and men adapt to women'southward new roles exterior the household, we should observe a return to stable partnerships and fertility levels around replacement rate.

The shift from the first to the second phase of the gender revolution lies in the adoption of egalitarian gender attitudes by a majority of the population, which volition propel a behavioral and institutional shift in support of gender equality at home and in the labor market place (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). Differently from other perspectives on the gender revolution (e.grand. Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; England, 2010), the gender revolution framework describes the advancement of the gender revolution equally "irreversible" (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015, p.12). The higher educated are expected to pb the shift toward egalitarian attitudes and behavior and, therefore, to beginning experience greater partnership stability and fertility (Goldscheider et al., 2015). The gender revolution framework, however, argues that educational differences volition narrow as the gender revolution nears its completion.

Converging Ethics but Diverging Partnership Behavior

The United States is considered to have exited the showtime phase of the gender revolution and entered the 2d (Stanfors & Goldscheider, 2017). Using the main indicator proposed by Arpino et al. (2015) and Esping-Andersen & Billari (2015) to identify the phases of the gender revolution, the majority of Americans have adopted egalitarian gender attitudes. Furthermore, in recent cohorts, Americans have expressed a stiff preference for egalitarian partnerships equally their ideal work-family model, with little variation beyond social classes and gender (Gerson, 2010; Pedulla & Thébaud, 2015). It is of import to recognize that the literature has not reached a consensus on whether a social form gradient to gender attitudes persists. What we tin draw from existing findings is that differences in gender attitudes across social classes have diminished over fourth dimension in the United States, especially in recent cohorts (Gerson, 2010).

Although egalitarian ideals have gained say-so across social strata, college education has become a growing determinant of differentiation in partnership behavior in the Us (McLanahan, 2004; Perelli-Harris & Gerber, 2011). Low educated men and women are increasingly less likely to ally and experience college levels of marital instability with respect to the past (Lundberg, Pollak, & Stearns, 2016). As noted by McLanahan (2004), the higher educated and the lower educated are on 2 distinct and diverging family unit paths, which testify no sign of convergence.

A limitation of the gender revolution framework is that information technology does not address how barriers to stable partnerships limit the adoption and stability of the egalitarian work-family platonic across social strata. Egalitarian gender norms point the possibility of embracing egalitarian practices but they do non account for the structural and institutional impediments to change in family behavior (Cherlin, 2016; Pedulla & Thébaud, 2015). Recent trends in gender egalitarianism and family behavior suggest that, in the U.s., differentiated partnership behavior across social classes cannot be entirely attributed to differences in gender attitudes. Instead, these parallel trends highlight how opportunities and resources constrain individuals' ability to enact their preferences (Gerson, 2010, p. 213).

The Gender Revolution in the United States: A Bifurcated Family Process

The gender revolution framework predicts a return to stable partnerships as society embraces egalitarian attitudes and practices. In the context of the Us, these predictions fit accurately the partnership behavior of young college-educated Americans, who are forming increasingly egalitarian and stable marriages. For the lower educated, withal, spousal relationship avoidance and marital instability dominate the second phase of the gender revolution considering they lack the resources to form and maintain egalitarian partnerships. Applying the gender revolution framework to the United States, I argue that (ane) the cultural meaning of matrimony amidst the lower educated, (2) increasing economic inequality and (three) the lack of family policies are three distinctive features of the American context that shape a bifurcated family unit process equally a response to the gender revolution.

In the U.s., the practical value of marriage has declined merely both the symbolic meaning of marriage and the desire to marry take remained high beyond all social classes (Cherlin, 2004; Edin & Kefalas, 2005). Although marrying in fewer numbers, economically disadvantaged Americans continue to value marriage highly but often decide not to marry considering they are unable to meet the financial standards they perceive as essential to marital stability (Edin & Reed, 2005). The cultural pregnant of these prerequisites remains minor and is ofttimes limited to securing two stable jobs, the ability to take out a mortgage, and to beget a nuptials ceremony (Edin & Kefalas, 2005; Gibson-Davis, 2009). With the growth of precarious employment, less educated Americans face low wages, with trivial to no benefits, and depression job stability over their life course with respect to their higher-educated counterparts (Kalleberg, 2012). In detail, the loss of proficient jobs for depression educated men has increasingly contributed to preventing the less educated from securing the resources necessary to form stable partnerships, leading many disadvantaged Americans to forego marriage (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2017; Cherlin, 2014; McLanahan, 2004; Ruggles, 2015).

The economic and social barriers to wedlock are further reinforced past the increasing prevalence of egalitarian gender norms, which promote the egalitarian model as the new ideal work-family arrangement for couples. This ideal remains, all the same, conditional on securing a stable employment and meeting the high time demands of parenting. In fact, in her qualitative interviews, Gerson (2010) institute that young Americans are well aware of the economic and social challenges of forming an egalitarian partnership and frequently express fallback plans. Although the egalitarian ideal is shared among men and women, the fallback plans are highly gendered. Every bit their "Plan B", men would opt for a neo-traditional relationship, where the human is the primary worker and the woman the primary carer. In dissimilarity, women would cull economic independence over a neo-traditional organization if an egalitarian relationship were non to exist viable. Because the structural barriers to the egalitarian ideal are unequal across social classes, marriage avoidance amongst lower educated women is likely to be reinforced by their inability to grade egalitarian relationships and their preference for cocky-reliance as a fallback programme.

Furthermore, in the second part of the gender revolution framework, institutional support for dual-earner couples should facilitate the adoption of gender egalitarian practices within and exterior the family unit (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015). In the United States, however, the country is more often than not silent on piece of work-family issues (Cooke & Baxter, 2010). Families resort to private services or rely on their relatives to outsource domestic work (Lewis, 2009). The lack of public support for dual-earner families means that the lower educated are unlikely to exist able to afford services that help the reconciliation of piece of work and family demands; due east.k. private childcare services or professional cleaners (Craig, Perales, Vidal, & Baxter, 2016; Gerstel & Clawson, 2014). Furthermore, less educated women are also more probable to be in vulnerable occupations that provide little access to formal work-family benefits (Enchautegui-de-Jesús, 2009). Maintaining the egalitarian platonic is likely to be more difficult for families with less resource and generate marital tensions when these egalitarian expectations are unmet (Sherman, 2017). If it is only the highly educated who have the means to reduce their piece of work-family challenges, the stabilization of marriages in the 2d phase of the gender revolution is probable to be full-bodied amidst college-educated Americans.

The Current Study

This written report tests 4 hypotheses that arise from the theoretical background. First, I provide an empirical test of the predictions of the gender revolution framework on entry into and leave from spousal relationship. I expect that, when gender norms are predominantly traditional, an initial increase in the prevalence of egalitarian attitudes will produce a decline in marriage germination and a ascent in divorce. Equally egalitarian gender norms proceeds authority, the human relationship should reverse. Specifically, I examine the following ii hypotheses:

• Hypothesis 1a The association between society-level egalitarian gender norms and marriage germination follows a U-shaped relationship.

• Hypothesis 1b The clan between society-level egalitarian gender norms and divorce follows an inverted U-shaped relationship.

The first 2 hypotheses, however, may not hold if there are important social grade differences in the clan between gender norms and wedlock dynamics. Alternatively, I argue that the predictions of the gender revolution framework for matrimony dynamics will produce a bifurcated response amid the higher and lower social strata. I wait the reversals in matrimony and divorce rates at higher levels of egalitarian gender norms to exist concentrated amidst the college-educated. Specifically, I examine the following two hypotheses:

• Hypothesis 2a An increase in egalitarian gender norms predicts a turn down in union germination for women without college teaching. In contrast, I expect the relationship between egalitarian gender norms and marriage to be U-shaped for college-educated women.

• Hypothesis 2b An increase in egalitarian gender norms predicts a rise in divorce for women without college instruction. In contrast, I expect the relationship betwixt egalitarian gender norms and divorce to exist inverted U-shaped for college-educated women.

Method

Data

The empirical assay combined private- and regional-level information to report how contextual gender norms influence entry into and exit from marriage. I matched individual-level marriage histories from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/) to a regional index of gender norms constructed from the General Social Surveys (http://gss.norc.org/). The analysis likewise included time-varying regional variables, which were based on the March Current Population Surveys information from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (https://u.s..ipums.org/usa/) (King et al., 2010). Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1 for the marriage models and in Table 2 for the divorce models. Farther explanation on how each variable was constructed and a study on missing values can be found in the online appendix A.

Table 1

Descriptive statistics of variables for the union models.

	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Region-level variables
Gender norms index	0.00	0.26	−0.87	0.44
Gender norms index sq.	0.07	0.12	0.00	0.75
Male person unemployment charge per unit	7.09	2.32	2.01	14.98
Women's employment rate	54.44	6.40	37.74	69.35
% of tertiary educated women	21.43	7.34	6.81	twoscore.lx
Individual-level variables
Duration unpartnered	7.73	5.88	i.00	25.00
Duration unpartnered sq.	94.33	132.67	1.00	625.00
Ever Married	0.xviii	0.39	0.00	one.00
Race
White (Ref.)	0.75	0.43	0.00	one.00
Black	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Other	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Education
Less than high school diploma (Ref.)	0.fourteen	0.35	0.00	1.00
High school diploma	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Some higher	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
College caste	0.28	0.45	0.00	one.00
Historic period
16–18 (Ref.)	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
19–21	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
22–24	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00
25–27	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
31–twoscore	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Presence of kid(ren) ages 0–3	0.x	0.30	0.00	1.00
Number of children	1.61	1.54	0.00	14.00
Region
New England	0.05	0.22	0.00	i.00
Middle Atlantic	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
East Northward Central	0.nineteen	0.39	0.00	1.00
West North Central	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
Due south Atlantic	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
East South Central	0.06	0.24	0.00	one.00
West Due south Central	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Mountain	0.05	0.23	0.00	1.00
Pacific	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00
Birth twelvemonth (1929 = 0)	38.59	12.97	0.00	64.00

Table 2

Descriptive statistics of variables for the divorce models.

	Hateful	SD	Min	Max
Region-level variables
Gender norms alphabetize	0.02	0.21	−0.88	0.43
Gender norms alphabetize sq.	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.77
Male unemployment rate	7.12	ii.23	2.01	14.98
Female employment rate	54.94	5.84	37.74	69.35
% of tertiary educated women	21.34	6.72	6.81	xl.60
Couple- and Individual-level variables
Log of matrimony elapsing	1.72	0.85	0.00	3.22
Wife'southward showtime union	0.87	0.34	0.00	1.00
Wife's age at start of marriage	23.48	four.xl	16.00	40.00
Married woman'due south age at start of wedlock sq.	570.57	224.71	256.00	1600.00
Married woman's race
White	0.87	0.34	0.00	1.00
Black	0.07	0.26	0.00	one.00
Other	0.06	0.23	0.00	one.00
Wife's education
Less than loftier schoolhouse diploma	0.14	0.35	0.00	ane.00
Loftier school diploma	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Some higher	0.26	0.44	0.00	i.00
College degree	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Husband'southward instruction
Less than high school diploma	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Loftier school diploma	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Some higher	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
College degree	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Spousal age departure
Age homogamy	0.lx	0.49	0.00	1.00
Married woman is older	0.06	0.25	0.00	1.00
Husband is older	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Presence of kid(ren) ages 0–3	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Number of children	ane.48	1.22	0.00	12.00
Region
New England	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00
Middle Atlantic	0.fourteen	0.35	0.00	ane.00
East Northward Central	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Westward North Central	0.11	0.31	0.00	i.00
South Atlantic	0.sixteen	0.36	0.00	1.00
Eastward South Central	0.07	0.26	0.00	ane.00
Westward South Central	0.10	0.xxx	0.00	1.00
Mountain	0.06	0.25	0.00	1.00
Pacific	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Marriage year (1968 = 0)	17.77	11.17	0.00	44.00

The assay focused on U.Due south. women who were present in the PSID between the years 1968 to 2012 and who reported a consummate marital history. Retrospective wedlock data were collected retrospectively for all respondents starting in 1985. The marital histories were defined from the woman'south perspective and were restricted to marriages that occurred between 1968 and 2012 for spouses betwixt the ages of 16 and 40. Observations were right-censored at the earliest of the post-obit events: the death of the respondent, age 40 or the final recorded interview.

Previously married women and higher-guild marriages were included in the assay. The concluding sample for the marriage models was equanimous of 12,073 women who experienced 14,014 spells of singlehood of which half dozen,430 ended in marriage. Spells of singlehood had an average duration of nearly viii years and about 18% had been previously married (See Table 1). The last sample for the divorce assay was composed of 8,066 women who experienced 8,713 marriages of which 1,914 ended in divorce. Marriages had an average duration of about half dozen years, first order marriages represented 87% of the sample, and the average age at marriage was 23 (Meet Tabular array 2). Descriptive statistics were weighted using family weights, normalized to 1 in each survey year. I chose not to weight the statistical models because my control variables adjusted for the major factors used in constructing the weights. Additional analyses showed that the main findings were robust to the utilise of sample weights (See the online appendix E).

Measures

Effect variables: Marriage and divorce events

The dependent variable for the marriage model was defined as a binary variable that took the value of 1 in the year in which the respondent got married and 0 otherwise. For the divorce model, the dependent variable was also defined as a binary variable that took the value of one in the year in which the couple either separated or divorced and 0 otherwise. Whenever both the separation and divorce dates were reported, the earliest date was considered as the cease of the marriage.

Key explanatory variables

The key explanatory variables were a contextual indicator of gender attitudes and its interaction with women'south educational attainment. Following the gender revolution framework, the beginning empirical test laid in the functional course of the human relationship between the prevalence of egalitarian gender attitudes and the two outcome variables of interest: wedlock and divorce. Turning to the bifurcated family process hypotheses, the 2nd empirical test laid in the interaction between whether the respondent had a four-twelvemonth higher degree and the prevalence of egalitarian gender attitudes. I followed the operationalization of the gender revolution framework developed in Arpino et al. (2015) and Esping-Andersen & Billari (2015), where the prevalence of egalitarian gender attitudes was used to capture the advancement of the gender revolution.

The contextual indicator of gender attitudes, which I labeled the gender norms index, was aggregated at the regional level and for every year betwixt 1968 and 2012. The gender norms alphabetize was based on the following questions from the GSS: (i) Information technology is much ameliorate for everyone involved if the man is the achiever exterior the home and the woman takes intendance of the home and family (FEFAM); (ii) A working female parent tin establish as warm and secure a relationship with her children every bit a mother who does non work (FECHLD); (iii) A preschool kid is likely to endure if his or her mother works (FEPRESC). The questionnaire asked respondents, on a 1 (strongly agree) to iv (strongly disagree) scale, to point whether they agreed or disagreed with the argument.

These three questions were asked in the post-obit eighteen survey years: in 1977, 1985–1986, 1988–1991, 1993 and every 2 years from 1994 to 2012. All the available surveys were pooled and a principal-factor analysis was carried out to obtain a unique index where higher scores represented more than egalitarian gender attitudes (Cronbach'south blastoff = 0.74; meet Appendix B for more details). To fill the missing years before 1977 and between 1977 and 2010, an interpolation was carried out. Additional analyses showed that the results were not sensitive to the interpolation of the gender index (See the online appendix East). In the regression models, the gender norms alphabetize was centered on its thou mean.

The index used in this paper replicates closely the one developed past Cotter et al. (2011) to capture trends in gender attitudes in the United states of america. The iii items loaded on a unique gene but they summarized several dimensions of gender credo: gendered split up spheres, mother's guilt and working women'due south human relationship quality with their children (see Davis and Greenstein, 2009, for a review). All of which were relevant to the theoretical argument of this article. Ideally, the gender alphabetize should take as well included items regarding men and fatherhood only no such questions were asked in early years of the GSS.

The gender norms index was aggregated at the regional level to capture contextual norms toward gender roles. The region nomenclature corresponds to the U.S. census divisions (see the online appendix C for the definition of each region). The unit of assemblage was the region rather than the state for two main reasons: (1) The public version of the GSS only provided the region at interview; (2) The target sample of the GSS was of about one,500 respondents, which was excessively modest to derive reliable state-level measures. The state level would accept provided a more than accurate unit of measurement of assay but the region had the advantage of decreasing the gamble of non-random assignment to the context of residence.

Control variables

In both the marriage and divorce models, I controlled for the woman's level of education, her race, and her region of residence. I as well included two variables to capture family attributes: the number of children in the household and an indicator variable for the presence of children under the historic period of 4. The education variable was composed of four categories: less than loftier school (the reference category), high school diploma, 2-twelvemonth college/some college, four-year college degree or more. The race variable included three categories: white (reference category), Blackness, or other race or ethnicity. The region of residence variable took nine unlike values: New England (reference category), Middle Atlantic, Due east N Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Fundamental, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific.

In the marriage analysis, I also considered whether the respondent had been married previously and included dummy variables for the year of birth (the omitted category was the largest birth year, 1964). The respondent's age at the time of the survey was controlled for using a chiselled variable, which took five values: 16–xviii (reference category), 19–21, 22–24, 25–27, 31–40. The divorce models controlled for age at marriage and its squared value, whether it was the wife'southward first marriage and dummy variables for the spousal relationship year (the omitted category was the largest matrimony accomplice, 1973). For the hubby, educational attainment was included, whereas race and age at union were excluded because they are highly correlated with the married woman's characteristics. The husband's education variable took four values: less than high schoolhouse (the reference category), high schoolhouse diploma, 2-year college/some college, 4-year higher degree or more. Spousal age deviation was besides included as a chiselled variable taking the following three values: the age divergence was junior to 2 years (reference category), the wife was at least two years older, the husband was at least two years older. Finally, in the matrimony models, the duration was specified as a quadratic function and in the divorce models, as a logarithmic function. The duration functional forms were chosen to fit best the information.

In the biennial survey years, fourth dimension-varying variables were imputed using information reported in the adjacent years. For the region of residence, additional survey questions nearly the respondent's geographical motion were used to impute the missing years (come across the online appendix A for a detailed explanation).

At the regional level, I considered alternative contextual mechanisms to gender norms, which were constitute to exist relevant in previous studies. Using IPUMS March CPS, I constructed yearly variables to command for women'southward changing roles in the labor market and in third education by including the regional women'southward employment rate and the regional share of women with tertiary education. To avoid decision-making for factors that might be on the causal pathway from gender norms to marriage dynamics, I lagged the women's didactics and employment variables by 5 years. Finally, the regional men's unemployment rate was as well included to capture the deterioration of men'southward position in the labor market.

Models

Entry into and exit from marriage were estimated using a discrete event-history logistic model with random effects at the adult female-level to account for repeated events. For each result, I estimated iv models in sequence. Model 1 was specified as follows:

h _irt =α f(GI _rt ) +β _one X _irt +β ₂ I _r +β ₃ I _c +u _i

(1)

For a woman i living in region r and in year t with individual-level characteristics 10_irt, the corresponding gender norms index is represented past f(GI_rt). f(.) represents the functional grade of the gender norms index. In line with the hypotheses, both a linear and quadratic functional course were tested for each model. I_r is a set of dummy variables for each region. I_c is also a set of dummy variable for each cohort. In the marriage models, I controlled for the birth accomplice, i.e. the year of birth, and in the divorce models for the matrimony cohort, i.e. the year of marriage. The regional and cohort stock-still effects controlled for unobservable and time-invariant differences in marriage propensities of each cohort and region. For the divorce models, I considered the union year rather than the nascence year to capture the context at the fourth dimension of union. Furthermore, in all the models, I indirectly controlled for the effects of the historical context (Teachman, 2002, p. 335). In the marriage model, the historical context was divers as the sum of the nativity year, the unpartnered duration and the respondent'south age (age was necessary because I included repeated events). In the divorce model, the historical context was divers as the sum of marriage year, the marriage duration, and the respondent's age at marriage (hither as well age at marriage was necessary because college-order marriages were included in the analysis).

Model 2 added a linear regional-specific cohort trends 50_cr, which is an interaction between the accomplice year and the region of residence:

h _irt =α f(GI _rt ) +β ₁ 10 _irt +β ₂ I _r +β ₃ I _c +β ₄ L _cr +u _i

(2)

The region-specific accomplice trends accounted for unobservable trends within cohort and region, which could exist correlated with changes in gender norms. For case, one would expect that religiosity and the acceptance of divorce followed like trends to gender norms for each cohort and inside the different regions in the sample.

Model three added three regional time-varying confounders Z_rt as discussed in the control variables:

h _irt =α f(GI _rt ) +β _i X _irt +β ₂ I _r +β ₃ I _c +β ₄ L _cr +β ₅ Z _rt +u _i

(3)

The region-year variables were introduced in the model to control for spuriousness between gender norms and the two consequence variables of interest: marriage and divorce. These control variables captured parallel structural changes that may exist related to both gender attitudes and partnership behavior. Failing to control for these variables could lead to misreckoning the outcome of gender norms with other variables, which also affected our variables of involvement. Moreover, these control variables were measured at the regional level and were time varying and, therefore, contributed to removing any period effects from the estimated coefficients for the gender norms index.

Model 4 included an interaction between the gender norms index and the respondent's higher education attainment:

h_irt =α f(GI_rt) +COLL _i +δ f(GI_rt) ×COLL _i + β_aneX_irt + β₂I_r + β_threeI_c + β₄L_cr + β_vZ_rt + u_i

(4)

The coefficient δ indicates whether the relationship between contextual gender norms and marriage dynamics was different for women with and without a college education.

Results

The structure of the results department is as follows. First, I focus on the clan between regional gender norms and marriage. And so, I plough to the findings for divorce. For each outcome, I nowadays the results for the 4 models described above comparison a linear and quadratic functional class to model the human relationship between regional gender norms and spousal relationship dynamics. Finally, I appraise the robustness of the main findings by carrying out several sensitivity checks.

Gender Norms and Union Formation

Table 3 presents the results from the discrete outcome-history assay of the clan betwixt gender norms and matrimony formation. For the sake of parsimony, Table three but shows the coefficients of the primal explanatory variables. The estimates for all the control variables can exist found in the online appendix D in Tabular array D1 for the linear functional course and in Table D2 for the quadratic functional class.

Table 3

Gender Norms Index equally a Predictor of Marriage: Multilevel Logistic Regression

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4
Variable	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR
Linear
Gender norms index	−two.235 ***	(0.160)	0.107	−two.337 ***	(0.165)	0.097	−1.501 ***	(0.238)	0.223	−one.664 ***	(0.239)	0.189
4-year college pedagogy										−0.627 ***	(0.056)	0.534
GI × 4-yr higher education										1.574 ***	(0.189)	4.826
Quadratic
Gender norms index	−ane.951 ***	(0.256)	0.142	−2.120 ***	(0.277)	0.120	−1.326 ***	(0.323)	0.266	−1.790 ***	(0.330)	0.167
Gender norms index sq.	0.413	(0.291)	ane.511	0.306	(0.316)	1.358	0.265	(0.332)	1.303	−0.318	(0.351)	0.728
iv-year higher education										−0.832 ***	(0.071)	0.435
GI × 4-year higher teaching										2.591 ***	(0.283)	13.343
GI sq. × four-year college education										2.683 ***	(0.546)	14.629
Regional fixed effects	+			+			+			+
Birth twelvemonth fixed effects	+			+			+			+
Regional cohort linear trend				+			+			+
Time-varying regional variables							+			+

Starting from the gender revolution framework (Hypothesis 1a), I focus on the outset iii models presented in Tabular array iii to evaluate the association between regional gender norms and marriage. The results showed that merely the linear specification was statistically significant (see Model 1–3 in Table 3). When both the linear and quadratic terms of the gender norms index were included, the coefficient of the quadratic term never reached statistical significance.

In the linear specification, the gender norms alphabetize coefficient was statistically significant (p<0.001) and negative. The results presented in Table 3 suggested that increases toward gender-equal norms predicted a linear and negative human relationship with the probability of marriage germination. Going from Model 1 to Model three, the coefficient of the gender norms index became smaller every bit the regional confounders were included in the model.

To illustrate the magnitude of the clan between the regional gender norms index and the probability of marriage germination, Figure i-A displays the predicted probabilities of union going from a traditional regional context to an egalitarian 1. The full line represents the predicted values and the grey expanse corresponds to the 95% confidence intervals. The plotted values are based on Model 3-Linear in Table 3 and the average predicted probabilities were calculated property all other independent variables to their actual values. In line with the findings presented in Table 3, increases in egalitarian gender norms were negatively associated with union formation.

Boilerplate PREDICTED Association Between THE GENDER NORMS INDEX AND MARRIAGE.

As shown by the results presented in Table 3 and the predicted probabilities illustrated in Figure 1-A, the relationship betwixt gender-egalitarian norms and the probability of marriage did not testify whatever sign of reversal or tapering, as the gender revolution framework would predict. The results did non support the Hypothesis 1a of a U-shaped relationship between egalitarian gender norms and marriage.

Notwithstanding, the results presented for Model 1–iii in Table 3 practical to women of all didactics levels. To bring further evidence to the bifurcated family process argument (Hypothesis 2a), the empirical findings demand to show that changes in the prevalence of gender-egalitarian norms predict diverging marriage patterns past educational attainment. In Table 3, Model 4 included the gender norms index and its interaction with having a 4-yr higher caste. Both the linear and quadratic specifications are presented in Table iii. Considering the reference category of the educational activity variable corresponds to not having a college degree, the coefficients of the gender norms alphabetize can be interpreted for not-college graduates. The interactions between college teaching and the gender norms index test whether the relationship between gender norms and union is different by women'southward education.

In both the linear and quadratic specification, the results showed that the interactions were positive and statistically pregnant (Model 4 in Table 3). Focusing on the quadratic Model 4, the results showed that the quadratic term of the gender norms index was only statistically significant when interacted with college education. This coefficient suggested that the negative relationship betwixt the regional gender norms index and marriage only applied to non-college graduates. Instead, for women with college education, the human relationship appeared to be not-linear.

To further understand the results of Model 4, Figure one-B illustrates the predicted probabilities of union -by educational attainment -going from a traditional regional context with respect to gender norms to an egalitarian ane (Model 4-Quadratic in Table 3). For higher-educated women, the relationship between the regional gender index and spousal relationship is represented by a full line. For women without a 4-year college degree, the average predicted probabilities are depicted past a dashed line. The predictive margins were calculated belongings all other independent variables to their actual values. To exam whether the educational gradient is statistically significant, the average predicted probabilities are presented with conviction intervals adapted for pairwise comparisons (Goldstein & Healy, 1995).

In line with the regression results presented in Table 3, the differences in predicted probabilities between women with a 4-twelvemonth higher caste and women without one were statistically significant, equally shown by the lack of overlap in the confidence intervals. Figure 1-B shows that increases in the prevalence of egalitarian gender-norms predicted a steep decline in marriage rate for women without college education. For college-educated women, the human relationship between regional gender norms and spousal relationship followed a U-shaped relationship. Overall, higher-educated women had a lower predicted probability of marrying with respect to their less-educated counterparts. However, when the gender index reached a value of most −0.25, the predicted marriage rate for college-educated women started increasing and overtook the one for women without a college education.

Taken together, the empirical findings for marriage provided robust show for Hypothesis 2a. The results showed that changes in the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms predicted a bifurcated family procedure between those with and without college education.

Gender Norms and Divorce

Table 4 presents the results from the detached outcome-history analysis of the association between gender norms and divorce. For the sake of parsimony, Table 4 only shows the coefficients of the key explanatory variables of interest. The estimates for all the control variables tin be establish in the online appendix D in Table D3 for the linear functional form and in Tabular array D4 for the quadratic functional form.

Table 4

Gender Norms Index as a Predictor of Divorce: Multilevel Logistic Regression

	Model 1			Model 2			Model iii			Model four
Variable	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR	B	SE B	OR
Linear
Gender norms index	−0.197	(0.312)	0.821	−0.355	(0.320)	0.701	0.157	(0.433)	1.170	0.179	(0.434)	1.196
4-twelvemonth college education										−0.570 ***	(0.102)	0.566
GI × four-yr college didactics										−0.132	(0.441)	0.876
Quadratic
Gender norms index	−2.061 ***	(0.453)	0.127	−3.197 ***	(0.515)	0.041	−2.028 ***	(0.574)	0.132	−two.003 ***	(0.577)	0.135
Gender norms index sq.	−4.098 ***	(0.729)	0.017	−v.836 ***	(0.842)	0.003	−v.109 ***	(0.878)	0.006	−5.039 ***	(0.890)	0.006
4-year higher education										−0.532 ***	(0.124)	0.587
GI × 4-yr college education										−0.200	(0.525)	0.819
GI sq. × iv-yr higher pedagogy										−1.055	(1.709)	0.348
Regional fixed effects	+			+			+			+
Marriage yr stock-still effects	+			+			+			+
Regional cohort linear trend				+			+			+
Time-varying regional variables							+			+

As with the matrimony models, I first focus on Model i–iii in Tabular array 4, which capture the association between the regional gender norms index and divorce for women across all levels of didactics. Comparing the coefficients for the gender norms alphabetize in the linear and the quadratic models, the results showed that only the quadratic functional was statistically significant. In the quadratic models, the linear and quadratic coefficients of the gender alphabetize were negative and statistically meaning. The quadratic divorce models' findings implied a not-linear human relationship betwixt regional gender norms and the probability to divorce. When gender norms were traditional, an increment in the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms was positively associated with divorce. Conversely, when gender norms became predominantly egalitarian, the relationship reversed. These results remained consistent through the three unlike model specifications.

Figure 2 shows the average predicted divorce probability respective to unlike levels of the gender norms index. The predicted probabilities are based on Model 3-Quadratic in Table 4. The values plotted in Figure 2 were calculated holding all other independent variables to their actual values. The full line illustrates the predicted divorce probability using the quadratic grade regression. The greyness expanse represents the 95% confidence intervals around the predicted values. The vertical line indicates the value of the gender norms index at which the relationship reverses.

Average PREDICTED ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE GENDER NORMS INDEX AND DIVORCE.

Confirming the results presented in Table 4, the predicted probabilities showed an inverted U-shaped pattern betwixt the regional boilerplate gender norms and the probability of divorce. The results suggested that it was simply when a larger share of society had adopted egalitarian gender attitudes that an increase in gender norms became negatively associated with divorce. The reversal in the relationship between gender norms and divorce occurred when the index took a value of about −.ii.

The findings for divorce were in line with the gender revolution perspective (Hypothesis 2a), which predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship betwixt regional gender norms and marital dissolution. An initial increase in the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms had a destabilizing effect on marriage. However, when egalitarian gender norms were supported by a critical mass, a decline in divorce was observed as club moved toward equality.

Turning to the bifurcated family procedure argument, the divorce models were replicated including an interaction term between regional gender norms and higher instruction. Results are presented in Model 4 in Table 4. In both the linear and quadratic Model 4, none of the interactions terms between gender norms and having a iv-year college caste were found to exist statistically significant. In contrast with the marriage results, the findings presented in Tabular array iv showed that in that location was no educational gradient to the relationship between gender norms and divorce. Contrary to Hypothesis 2b, the relationship between contextual gender norms and divorce was non chastened past higher education.

Sensitivity analysis

To address concerns about the robustness of the findings, the models were re-estimated under the following specifications: (i) excluding higher club events; (ii) excluding years prior to 1977 where the gender norms index was extrapolated; (iii) separately for households with and without children; (four) lagging the gender norms index by one or two years; (v) including a quadratic or a cubic cohort trend; (half dozen) including additional control variables to measure out legal access to the Pill and abortion and changes in divorce laws; (seven) constraining all respondents to their commencement observed region of residence; (eight) applying different sample weights and excluding the low-income families oversample (SEO); (six) measuring contextual gender norms at the national level instead of the regional level. The main findings of the article remained consistent across the different model specifications. The results of the sensitivity analysis can exist found in online appendix East.

Discussion

The main contributions of this article are 2-fold. First, this article presented the first empirical test of the gender revolution framework on spousal relationship dynamics in the The states. Second, the gender revolution framework was assorted with the bifurcated family process perspective to debate that -in the United States- increases in egalitarian gender norms afflicted marriage and divorce rates unequally across educational groups. To exam these different hypotheses, I applied event-history assay to a unique combination of datasets from the GSS, PSID and IPUMS-March CPS to study the association betwixt contextual gender norms and entry into marriage and get out from spousal relationship between the 1960s and 2010s.

The marriage results showed that the relationship between regional gender norms and union was chastened by whether women have a iv-yr college degree. Indeed, regional shifts toward gender equality predicted a decline in marriage for women without a higher degree. Consistently with the bifurcated family procedure argument, gender-egalitarian contexts were negatively associated with wedlock germination and evidenced the increasing selectivity of marriage. Instead, for college-educated women, the relationship between gender norms and marriage followed closely the predictions of the gender revolution framework of a U-shaped human relationship between egalitarian gender norms and marriage. An initial increase in egalitarianism when gender norms were mainly traditional predicted a pass up in wedlock. However, the human relationship reversed as egalitarian gender norms became dominant. At very high levels of the gender norms index, college-educated women fifty-fifty experienced a higher probability of wedlock with respect to their less-educated counterparts.

Turning to the divorce results, the association between regional gender norms and divorce followed an inverted U-shape. When gender norms were traditional, an increase in equality was positively associated with marital instability. Once the prevalence of gender-egalitarian attitudes reached intermediary levels, the clan between gender-egalitarian attitudes and divorce became negative. These findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the gender revolution perspective. Furthermore, in contrast with the marriage results, I did not discover an educational slope to the human relationship betwixt gender norms and divorce.

How can these results be interpreted? Taken together, the matrimony and divorce findings provided mixed bear witness for both the gender revolution and the bifurcated family process perspectives. The patterns observed for college-educated women suggest that highly educated women in gender-egalitarian contexts find marriage more attractive and feel lower levels of marital instability. These findings marshal perfectly with the predictions of the gender revolution of a return to stability as egalitarian gender norms and opportunities for women exterior the home align. For women without college teaching, nonetheless, the shift from traditionalism to egalitarianism predicts a continuous decline in marriage, which is consequent with the economical and social barriers to marriage literature (Edin & Reed, 2005). The finding is as well in line with a contempo written report past Kalmijn (2013), which constitute that in more gender-egalitarian European countries, college educated women were more probable to be in a spousal relationship.

Furthermore, the parallel findings of an increase in marriage abstention and a decline in divorce among lower educated women suggest that marriage selectivity is at play. As the gender revolution progresses, lower educated women announced to be choosing self-reliance over marriage when resource constrain the possibility of a stable and egalitarian marriage (Edin and Reed, 2005; Gerson, 2010). As a upshot, the refuse in divorce across all educational groups can partially be attributed to the fact that women who anticipate a higher risk of divorce select themselves out of marriage in the 2d phase of the gender revolution.

The assay does not come without caveats. Although a force of this article was the longitudinal approach, the data also presented some limitations because fewer control variables could be included in the analysis when using the entire span of the PSID. For example, religiosity, parental divorce and mother's employment during childhood were iii important variables that could not be considered in the 1968–2012 analysis. The PSID is also not representative of new waves of immigrants and, therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to these sub-groups of the U.S. population.

Another limitation of this study is that gender norms could only exist measured at the regional level. The U.S. census divisions captured important regional variation in attitudes, yet, recent studies that used cross-exclusive data take shown that lower levels of geographical analysis tin reveal important differences in the relationship betwixt contextual variables and partnership behavior (eastward.g. Cherlin, Ribar, & Yasutake, 2016). Besides, because the PSID does non provide any measures of gender ideology, the models did non control for the respondent's own gender credo. One the one mitt, this study found an educational gradient to the relationship betwixt gender norms and spousal relationship, which could capture differences in gender ideology between working-class and middle-class women. On the other hand, the divorce results suggested that the human relationship between gender norms and divorce is the aforementioned beyond social strata. Time to come work should integrate both individual and contextual measures of gender ideology to shed further light on these findings.

Overall, the results of this study suggest that, in the United States, the predictions of the gender revolution framework utilise to the college-educated only. I have argued that egalitarian gender norms only provide the possibility of adopting a stable egalitarian model. For Americans without a college degree, nevertheless, rise barriers to wedlock prevent them from reaching this new egalitarian ideal. The findings suggest that in a liberal welfare state with rise income inequality, the outcomes of the gender revolution increasingly announced to follow a bifurcated family unit process. Unless the state provides an ampler safety net for lower educated workers and supports dual-earner and dual-carer families, the gender revolution is unlikely to produce a unique social upshot in the United States. If nosotros want to foster stable and egalitarian partnerships, we demand theoretical frameworks and policies that enable men and women to human activity in accord with their egalitarian preferences across all social strata.

Supplementary Fabric

Supp info

Acknowledgments

The work has benefited from useful discussions with Bruno Arpino, Diederik Boertien, Joan Carreras Timoneda, Sarah Damaske, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Valarie Male monarch, Ashley Larsen Gibby, Sarah E. Patterson, Roberta Rutigliano, participants at PAA (2015) and the Population Research Institute Family Working Grouping (Pennsylvania Country Academy). The author gratefully acknowledges fiscal support during her PhD from the European Research Quango through the advanced ERC Grant ERC-2010-AdG-269387 (Family polarization, P.I. Gøsta Esping-Andersen) and during her postdoctoral fellowship from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Kid Health and Human Development to the Population Inquiry Institute at The Pennsylvania Land University for Population Research Infrastructure (P2-CHD041025) and Family Demography Training (T32-HD007514).

References

• Arpino B, Esping-Andersen G, Pessin L. How practice changes in gender role attitudes towards female employment influence fertility? A macro-level assay. European Sociological Review. 2015;31(3):370–382. doi: ten.1093/esr/jcv002. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
• Autor D, Dorn D, Hanson G. (NBER Working Newspaper, 23173). When piece of work disappears: manufacturing decline and the falling marriage-market value of men. 2017 [Google Scholar]
• Cherlin AJ. The deinstitutionalization of American matrimony. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2004;66(iv):848–861. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3600162. [Google Scholar]
• Cherlin AJ. Labor's love lost: the rise and fall of the working-class family unit in America. Russell Sage Foundation; 2014. [Google Scholar]
• Cherlin AJ. A Happy ending to a half-century of family change? Population and Development Review. 2016;42(1):121–129. doi: x.1111/j.1728-4457.2016.00111.10. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
• Cherlin AJ, Ribar DC, Yasutake Due south. Nonmarital first births, marriage, and income inequality. American Sociological Review. 2016;81(4):749–770. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Cooke LP, Baxter J. "Families" in international context: Comparing institutional effects across Western societies. Journal of Spousal relationship and Family. 2010;72(3):516–536. [Google Scholar]
• Cotter D, Hermsen JM, Vanneman R. The end of the gender revolution? Gender part attitudes from 1977 to 2008. American Journal of Sociology. 2011;117(1):259–289. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Craig L, Perales F, Vidal S, Baxter J. Domestic outsourcing, housework time, and subjective time pressure level: New insights from longitudinal data. Journal of Marriage and Family. 2016;78(5):1224–1236. doi: 10.1111/jomf.12321. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
• Davis SN, Greenstein TN. Gender credo: Components, predictors, and consequences. Annual Review of Sociology. 2009;35:87–105. [Google Scholar]
• Edin K, Kefalas M. Promises I can keep: Why poor women put maternity earlier spousal relationship. University of California Press; 2005. [Google Scholar]
• Edin Thou, Reed JM. Why don't they simply get married? Barriers to matrimony among the disadvantaged. The Future of Children. 2005;15(2):117–137. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Enchautegui-de-Jesús North. Challenges Experienced past Vulnerable Hourly Workers: Issues to Consider in the Policy Conversation to Address These Problems. In: Booth A, Crouter AC, editors. Piece of work-Life Policies that Make a Real Difference for Individuals, Families, and Organizations. Washington, DC: Urban Institute; 2009. pp. 207–217. [Google Scholar]
• England P. The gender revolution: Uneven and stalled. Gender & Society. 2010;24(2):149–166. [Google Scholar]
• Esping-Andersen Thousand, Billari FC. Re-theorizing family demographics. Population and Development Review. 2015;41(1):one–31. doi: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2015.00024.ten. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
• Gerson K. The unfinished revolution: How a new generation is reshaping family, piece of work, and gender in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010. [Google Scholar]
• Gerstel N, Clawson D. Class reward and the gender divide: Flexibility on the job and at home. American Periodical of Sociology. 2014;120(2):395–431. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Gibson-Davis CM. Coin, marriage, and children: Testing the financial expectations and family formation theory. Periodical of Marriage and Family. 2009;71(1):146–160. [Google Scholar]
• Goldscheider F, Bernhardt E, Lappegård T. The gender revolution: A framework for understanding changing family unit and demographic behavior. Population and Evolution Review. 2015;41(ii):207–239. [Google Scholar]
• Goldstein JR. The leveling of divorce in the United states. Demography. 1999;36(3):409–414. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Goldstein H, Healy MJ. The graphical presentation of a collection of means. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society) 1995;158(ane):175–177. [Google Scholar]
• Goldstein JR, Sobotka T, Jasilioniene A. The end of "lowest-low" fertility? Population and Development Review. 2009;35(4):663–699. [Google Scholar]
• Guzzo KB. Trends in cohabitation outcomes: Compositional changes and date among never-married young adults. Journal of Marriage and Family unit. 2014;76(4):826–842. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Härkönen J. Divorce trends, patterns, causes, consequences. In: Treas J, Scott J, Richards M, editors. The Wiley-Blackwell companion to the sociology of families. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons; 2014. [Google Scholar]
• Kalleberg AL. Practiced jobs, bad jobs. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation; 2012. [Google Scholar]
• Kalmijn One thousand. The educational gradient in union: A comparison of 25 European countries. Demography. 2013;l(4):1499–1520. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Kennedy S, Bumpass L. Cohabitation and children's living arrangements: New estimates from the United states of america. Demographic Research. 2008;xix:1663. [PMC complimentary article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• King G, Ruggles S, Alexander JT, Flood S, Genadek K, Schroeder MB, Vick R. Integrated public employ microdata series, current population survey: Version 3.0 2010 [Google Scholar]
• Lesthaeghe R, Van de Kaa DJ. Twee demografische transities (Bevolking: Groei en krimp) Deventer: Van Loghum Slaterus; 1986. pp. 9–24. [Google Scholar]
• Lewis J. Work-family balance, gender and policy. Cheltenham, Britain; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2009. [Google Scholar]
• Lundberg Due south, Pollak RA, Stearns J. Family unit inequality: Diverging patterns in marriage, cohabitation, and childbearing. Journal of Economical Perspectives. 2016;30(ii):79–101. [PMC free commodity] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• McDonald P. Gender equity in theories of fertility transition. Population and Development Review. 2000;26(3):427–439. [Google Scholar]
• McLanahan S. Diverging destinies: How children are faring under the Decond Demographic Transition. Demography. 2004;41(4):607–627. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Myrskylä M, Kohler HP, Billari FC. High development and fertility: Fertility at older reproductive ages and gender equality explain the positive link. Population Studies Center, Academy of Pennsylvania; 2011. (PSC Working Paper Series No. PSC 11-06). [Google Scholar]
• Pedulla DS, Thébaud South. Can we terminate the revolution? Gender, work-family ethics, and institutional constraint. American Sociological Review. 2015;80(1):116–139. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Perelli-Harris B, Gerber TP. Nonmarital childbearing in Russia: Second demographic transition or blueprint of disadvantage? Demography. 2011;48(1):317–342. [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Ruggles S. Patriarchy, ability, and pay: The transformation of American families, 1800–2015. Demography. 2015;52(vi):1797–1823. [PMC gratuitous commodity] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
• Sherman J. "Stress That I Don't Need": Gender Expectations and Relationship Struggles among the Poor. Journal of Spousal relationship and Family unit. 2017;79(three):657–674. [Google Scholar]
• Stanfors K, Goldscheider F. The woods and the trees: Industrialization, demographic change, and the ongoing gender revolution in Sweden and the United States, 1870–2010. Demographic Research. 2017;36:173–226. [Google Scholar]
• Teachman JD. Stability across cohorts in divorce risk factors. Demography. 2002;39(two):331–351. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

schlinkwrign1989.blogspot.com

Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5766036/

Share this post